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THE CHANGING PARADIGM OF STATE IMMUNITY:
IMPUNITY OR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES?
Aravind Balajee*
"When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers, we are not simply protecting their trivial
old age, we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations!'
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The GagArchelago
Introduction
State officials or functionaries have often proved to be major perpetrators of internationd crimes and
human rights violations across the globe. The concept of state immunity has presented itself as an
important barrier against enforcement of international criminal law against incumbent or former state
officials or Heads of States in national courts. However, recently, the House of Lords blazed a new
trail in R v. Bow Streat Metropohtan Stpendiarj Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet' by denying state immunity to
General Augusto Pinochet of Chile against prosecution for international crimes and declaring that
state immunity of former Heads of States no longer presented an obstacle to the enforcement of international criminal law by national courts. In effect, the Pinochet decision greatly eroded the credibility of the defence of state immunity ir d-2is international criminal accountability.
Three years later, in 2002, the International Court of Justice' in DemorraticRepublic of Congo v. Ingdom
of Bekim' made it evident that it did not harbour the same view as the 1-louse of Lords. In this case,
the ICJ upheld state immunity of the Congolese Foreign Minister against prosecution in the Belgium
courts that had universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes. Unlike the Pinocbet case which
pertained to the immunity of a former Head of State, this case involved the immunity of an incumbent state officiaL The decision of the ICJ has come into conflict with an emerging body of internanonal opinion which welcomed the Pinochet decision.
This paper's primary focus is on studying the relevance of a traditional doctrine like state immunity,
that is rooted in state sovereignty, in an international legdl environment that is moving towards greater
accountability for international crimes. In this attempt, an introduction to the concept of state immunity and its historical origin has been provided. The paper attempts a study of the impact of the decisions in the Pinochet case and Congo v. Bejium on the legal status of the doctrine of state immunity.
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The Concept of State Immunity in International Law
The concept oF state immunity refers to the legal principles and rules under which a foreign state may
claim exemption from or suspension of or non-amenability to the jurisdiction of another state.' Jurisdiction in this context means the comprehensive governmental power of a state, including in particular, its legislative, judicial and administrative powers.' The effect of such immunity is that the
courts of one state are unable to exercise jurisdiction over a Head of State or official of another state
who is otherwise within their jurisdiction." Immunity mionae personae is personal immunity that grants
complete protection to existing Heads of States or officials. It renders him immune from all actions
or prosecutions, whether or not they relate to matters done for the benefit of the state. However, in
the case of former Heads of States or other officials, the immunity granted extends only to official
acts performed by them while in office. This functional or subject matter immunity is termed irnmunity rationaemateiae. This limited immunity is extended to preserve the dignity of the activities of the
foreign state during the period of office of the Head of State or other state officials.
Various factors have contributed to the emergence of state immunity. Primary amongst them is the
principle of par in parew non habet impenium, based upon the notion of equality and independence of
sovereigns.' As per the rules of international comity, sovereigns, in their official capacities, were
treated as extensions of the sovereign states. Sovereigns symbolised the states that they represented
and hence were granted immunity in the courts of other states. As summarised by the United States
Supreme Court in Schooner v Mac addon, the locus classies on the doctrine of state immunity:
"The full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign and being incapable of conferring extra territorial power, would not seem to
contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another and being bound by obligations of
the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or

lelmnt Steinberger,.Stae Imminity, 10 E. PuB INTL. L. 428. (Hereinafter "Steinberger"). State immunity must be disainguished from the doctrine of "act of state". Both doctrines involve refusal by the courts to take up a legal proceeding,
but they are distinct. Under the latter, the courts refuse to exercise jurisdiction as they feel that the issues are inappropriate for legal determination or are not capable of determination by legal standards- the issues are non-justicisble. Procedurally, a claim of state immunity is a preliminary jursdictional issue whereas a claim based on the doctrine of "act of
state" is a defence which goes to the merits of the case. Further, immunity can be waived by the defendant, whereas if
the court lacks the competence to deal judicially with the matter, this deficiency is less susceptible of being cured by aiy
action of the defendant. Sir Arthur Watts, LegalPosidon of Heads of Slate, Heads of Govenrnents, Foregn Minister, 247
Rt.DC. 12 (1994) at 60-61,
SId.
The rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional
immunities: urisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, immunity merely prevents exercise of jurisdiction. Se, Cano
v. Begium, supra note 3,
Lord Browne Wilkinson in Pinachet, epra note 1, at 111-112.
Set, SiP Rowsrj NNINtS AND Sia ARTnU
ter "OPPE-IlniiiN INTERNATIONAL LAW").

WATrs (eds.), OpPoRNi.aMI's INTERNATIONAL Law, VoL 1 1034 (1992). (lereinat-

WiuAi

R. STnsVENoN, FUNDAMENTAL PRsnrCvivs ON INTERNATIONAL Law 56-57 (1990). See also, OPPE'NNEsi's INTERLaw 327 (1998); J.E.S Fawcett. Geieral
Course on Pubic InternationalLa', 132 R. fl C. 365 (1971) at 398 (Hereinafter "Faweer); GEORGE SHWARZFNHIEi.riER AND ED
BaoxvN, A MANI)AL O INTERNATIONAL LAw 81 (1976).

Cf

NAToNAi

LAw, sypra note 8; IAN BROWNLIE, PIUNCTrr.ES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
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Changing Pradagmof State Immunity
its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a
foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonginj to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stiplated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him."
However, states can waive their immunity and subject their sovereignty to the jurisdiction of another
state." Immunity also ceases partially when the state element upon which it rests is removed, for cxample, when a Head of State leaves his post on the expiry of his term of appointment, and ceases
fully when there is a voluntary submission on behalf of the foreign state." Hence, existing customary
international law provides for exceptions and derogations from the rules regarding state immunity
Therefore they are not regarded as having attained the status of jus cogens norms." Consequently,
treaty provisions can prevail over the rules of state immunity.1

The Pinochet Case
The Pinochet case involved a number of complex issues on the status of the concept of state immuniry in light of the enforcement of international criminal law by national courts- an issue which till
then had not attracted detailed consideration. State immunity rarely posed a barrier to prosecution for
international crimes before international tribunals since international conventions which created these
tribunals inevitably excluded any defence of state immunity. However, the Pinorhek case showed that
the barrier posed by the concept of state immunity against prosecution for international crimes by national courts had not been overcome.
Background
General Augusto Pinochet had come to power in Chile through a military coup in 1973, after overthrowing the socialist government of Salvador Allende. While in power he was accused of being responsible for acts of genocide, murder, torture and the taking of hostages directed against his political opponents in Chile, Latin America and Europe. He was exonerated from criminal charges by a decree passed by the Chilean Senate in April 1978 which granted amnesty to all officials involved in human rights abuses during his regime for the "general tranquillity, peace and order of the nation"
in 1998, General Pinochet came to Britain for medical treatment. Judicial authorities in Spain sought
his extradition from the United Kingdom on a number of charges for various crimes including international crimes like torture committed in Spain and two international warrants were issued against
him. On Spain's request for extradition, a London court issued two warrants against Pinochet." The

A separate wakver may be required to permit e"ecution of the judgmnit.
Fsweetrt,

supro note

9, at 394-395.

j2
fuer

norms are peremptory norms of international law. Treaty provisions which derogate from these norms are void.
Se, Article 58 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.
Steinberger,

mpw nose

4, at 429.

As per Section 2 Of dic Extradition Act, 1989, which codified the principle of "double criminality", General Pinacher
could be extradited only if his alleged acts constituted a crime both in the United Kingdom and the stare seeking extradition, i.e. Spain. In the United Kingdom, torture has been criminalised by Section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 198B
which has been enacted by the United Kingdom to implement the Convenuon against Torture and other Cruel, inhuman

or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984.
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Divisional Court quashed both warrants on the ground that General Pinochet, as a former Head of
State, was entitled to state immunity in respect of the acts with which he was charged." An appeal
against this order was allowed by a majority of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords."
However, as one of the judges"on the Appellate Committee was associated with Amnesty International, an intervener in the case, the decision of the Appellate Committee was rendered void for the
possibility of bias- The House of Lords formed a new bench of 7 judges to re-decide the matter.N
This bench also decided that Pinochet was not entitled to state immunity and thereby allowed
Pinochet's extradition."
An Analysis of the Judgement
In the United Kingdom, Section 20(1) of the State Immunity Act of 1978, subject to necessary modifications, applies the Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964 to a "sovereign or other Head of State.... as it ap-

plies to the head of a diplomatic mission." The Diplomatic Privileges Act, incorporates the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, in its schedule. On the issue of immunity of diplomats whose
functions had come to an end, Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention states that: "... with respect to
acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity
shall continue to subsist." Therefore, this Article confers immunity rationaematniae on a former Head of
State "in respect of acts performed by him in the exercise of his functions as head of state"?

Se, R Obsndhi and J.C. Barker, The Pinobetjudgwent Anaksir and Impicaiors, 40(4) .
(Hereinafter "Ghandhi and Barker').

J.

INT'L, L, 657 (2000) at 664-665.

Reported in [19981 4 All iE.R 897, The House of Lords heard submissions by counsel for the Crown Prosecution Service
as appellants on behalf of Spain, Counsel for Pinochet, Amnesty International as interveners and as independent amirmr cariae. Written submissions were received from Human Rights Watch. Sir Arthur Watts, the co-editor of OPPENHEmsis lNTENasnu. Lav (9th edn.), and the author of the only monograph on the topic of immunity of Head of States, [IegalPositon qf H-eds of Sias, Headr of Governments, Fwagn Mizrk n 247 RDC. 12(1994)], appeared for the Home Office. The
Crown Prosecution Service, acting for Spain, was represented by Alun Jones, QC, an expert in extradition law, and Professor Christopher Greenwood from the London School of Economics was engaged to argue the issue on state imnuity.
The coalition of victims and human rights organisations including Amnesty International, the Medial Foundation for the
Care of Victims of Torture, and the Redress Trust engaged Professor Ian Brownlie of Oxford University. The panel of
judges who heard the Pinochet case were said to include several of the more progressive judges on the House of Lords, as
well as two of the four judges most involved in issues of interational law and human rights. Se, Michael Byers,
(visited on July 25, 2002). (1ereinafter 'fyers')
wdu
rldi/i/tt
sny
Lord Hoffmann, one of the law lords who decided die case served as a director of Amnesty International Charity Limited,
the organisation' research and educational branch. His wife had also worked for Amnesty International. Ibid.
See, Byers, sapre note 16.
Pinocher requesred the Home Secretary to disallow his extradition on medical grounds that he was unfit for trial. Jack
Straiw, the Home Secretary decided on the basis of an "unequivocal" and "unanimous" decision of a four member mcdical team which conducted Pinochet's medical examination that he was unfit to stand triaL The Divisionil Court on appeal
for judicial review of the Home Secretary's decision ordered disclosure of details of the medical report. Copies of the report were sent to Spain, Belgium, France and Switzerland, all of which had requested for Pinochet's extradition. They were
given time to make representations to the Home Secretary before he made his final decision. On March 2, 2000 the Home
Secretary came to the conclusion that Pinochet was free to go whereupon Pinochet departed for Chile- See, Ghandhi ad
Barker, spra note 15, at 708-709.
Lord Goff in Phrniet, upra note 1, at 119. Lord Browne Wilkinson held that under common law a former Head of State
enjoyed immunity raionsce eafriiae. He encountered difficulries in applying Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention. He
found no clear intention in this regard in the parliamentary history of the Stare Immunity Act. However, he held that the
Parliament could no have intended to give Heads of States and former Heads of States greater rights than what they already possessed, and therefore Pinochet enjoyed immunity ranae meaisne.
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To avail of the privileges contained in Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention, Pinocher's lawyers argued that the acts of torture formed part of a Head of State's official functions. The majority of the
House of Lords observed that torture is an international crime whose prohibition is ajuis cogenr norm.
Thus they held and it is submitted, rightly so, that torture could not constitute a Head of State's official functions and therefore, Pinochet was not entitled to immunity
The dissenting judges" held that torture could form part of the official functions of a Head of State.
In their opinion, there was nojus cogens norm disenitling a claim for state immunity in respect of international crires. 3 They stated that state immunity undoubtedly applies to criminal proceedings, 4
and to hold otherwise is unsound in principle-" Lord Goff applied Sir Arthur Watts' test as to
whether Pinochet's acts were "...under colour of or in ostensible exercise of the Head of State's public authority"' and concluded that they were so.' Lord Millett stated that Pinochet's alleged acts,
though international crimes, constituted official acts because they related to seizing and retaining of
power and hence constituted "governmental or sovereign acts."2
It is submitted that Lord Goff did not specifically address and refute the rationale of the majority decision that acts constituting international crimes or violatingjus cogens norms could not form part of a
Head of State's official functions. Instead he justified his argument by taking the stand that there was
no Jus cogws norm denying state immunity for international crimes. This argument would have been
relevant if the principles of state immunity constituted jus cogen norms In such a case, it would have
been necessary to prove the non-existence of a subsequent ju cogen norm denying state immumty for
international crimes because onejus cogens norm may be overridden only by a subsequent jus cogens
norm. However, as elaborated earlier, principles of state immunity do not constitute jus cogens norms
Therefore, there was no need to prove non-existence of a subsequentjur cogens norm denying state
immunity for international crimes. Only Lord Millet concluded clearly that even international crimes
could constitute functions of a Head of State.
Lord Hope, in another dissenting judgement, pointed out that as the official functions of a Head of
State were not capable of easy definition and could vary from state to state, torture could constitute
an official function of a Head of State? It is certainly true that the functions of a Head of State do
not yield to an exhaustive definition. However, the inability to exhaustively define functions of a
Head of State does not logically prevent the exclusion of acts constituting international crimes onyu
agen crimes from that definition.

a Comprising Lord Browne-Wilkinscn, Lord Hope, Lord Phillips and Lord Hutton.
Lord Hope, Lord Goff and Lord Milien.
Pinhel, supr note 1, at 116 citing Lord Slynn's decision

in the First Appeilate

Comnitee, [119
,914 Al] I-_L-897 at 913.

24 Lord Hope, Pinki, spra note 1, at 147.
a Lord Goff, Pavbet

npra note 1, at

119.

Sir Arthur Wats, Te LgalrPsition f Headr qf State, Headrof Cernments,FireignMinister, 247 R. L C. 12 (1994) at 120- 12L
Pinahiet, apra not 1, at 119.

a

Lord

*

Lord Hope, Pncse,

Nlieu, Pinhcet, supra
note

1, at 172.

sapr note 1, at

146.
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Implied Waiver of Immunity Rationae Materize under the Torture Convention
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
19 84e prohibits "official torture", i.e. torture committed by state officials in the exercise of their
functions' The oficainature of the act is essential to constitute a crime under the Torture Convention- However, this official nature is also an essential requirement for a claim tof state immunity There
is thus an overlap between the essential ingredient to constitute both the crime and the defense to it; a
unique legal situation. Additionally, the Torture Convention confers univetsal jurisdiction on national
courts of state parties to prosecute offenders under the Convention for acts committed anywhere irrespective of any territorial or other connection to the forum state. As Chile was a party to the Torture Convention, the second legal question witch arose in the Pinochet case was whether state parties
crimes under the Convention.
to the Torture Convention bad impliedly waived state immunity PI-a-r
being
a
party
to
the Torture Convention, then
If states had waived such immunity by the mere fact of
Chile could not claim immunity for Pinochet.
Lord Goff answered this question in the negative. He based his conclusion on the following reasons:

*
*

*

There could only be an express waiver of state immunitn- under Article 32(2) of the Vienna
Convention, which is incorporated into the law of the United Kingdom?
As a manier of treaty interpretaton, a waiver cannot be easily implied? The commentary on Article 7 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and their Property reiterates this principle.5
The usual examples of implied waiver are confined to submission by a state to the jurisdiction of
a court or tribunal by instituting or intervening in the proceedings, or by taking a step in the proceedings," none of which happened in this case.

Therefore the Pmnochel decision conclusively clarifies that statecs have nor impliedly waived state immunity by becoming parties to the Torture Convention.
The Inconsistency of Immunity Rationae Materiae with the Torture Convention
The third legal issue thrown up by the Pmocet case was whether the existence of immunity rationae
mateiae was inconsistent with the objects of the Torture Convention. On the basis of it being an-

Hercinafter the "Tortuore Covention."
Article

I or

ihe Trrure Conventon.

Panchet, rn/miv
note 1, 1
125. Lord Hope, the only other judge to consider this question, cancurred with Lord Goff on this
rationale. Phm setsm note 1, at 148.
As per Section 20(2) otf the State immunity Act, the Diplomatic Privileges Act applies in respect of immunities of Heads
of States and former Heads of States mularis altandis.
Phandefsprot oe , at 126 127
Psartess vwrantRe

lI, it 124.

INTIANriTEnoNi. L , .upra note 8, 35! 355. As per Article 7 of the International Law Commission's Draft Arthe Jurislictiona1 Trnmunities of States and their Property, there is express waver of State immunitr only: (n) I1

OritsetIuS

ticiv on
iniernational

agrerment, (b) in a written contract, or (c) by a declaration before the court or by a writen communication in
a specific procoeding. Paragraph 8 of the commentary on Article 7 provided that
. consent should not be taken for
granted, nor readili implied....Therc is therefore no roon for ipiyirg the consent of an unwilling state which has not cxpressed its conscnt in a clear and recognisable manner-
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swered in the affirmative, it was contended that Chile's obligations under the Torture Convention
would override its right to invoke immunity rationaepersonaefor Pinochet.
The Torture Convention confers jurisdiction on national courts to prosecute offenders for torture
committed irrespective of territorial, national or other connection. Spain contended that the primary
aim of the Torture Convention was to create an elaborate structure of universal jurisdiction to deprive offenders of a safe haven. It therefore argued that the concept of state immunity raonaer
naterraewas opposed to the object of the Torture Convention. A majority of the judges accepted this
contenton? Lord Saville explained that the Torture Convention created universal jurisdiction because the offending state could not be relied upon to punish the offender- Lord Goff, in his dissent,
stated that as the majority of the cases under the Convention would arise in the state to which the official belongs, the question of state immunity would arise in very rare cases. Therefore, he reasoned
that the existence of state immunity radinaemateriae would not defeat the objects of the Torture ConventionIt is submitted that though a majority of the offenders under the Torture Convention may be prosecuted in their own states, the existence of immunity radonae materiarwould nevertheless act as a barrier to the achievement of the objects of the Convention. Burgers and Danelius (respectively the
Chairman of the United Nations Working Group on the Torture Convention and the draftsmen of
its first draft) have pointed out that it was "an essential purpose (of the Torture Convention) to ensure that a torturer does not escape the consequences of his acts by going to another country.""' The
hindrance created by the presence of immunity radonaemateriae against the possible future exercise of
universal jurisdiction by state parties to the Torture Convention, even in a few instances, would thus
defeat the object of the Convention.
Lord Goff stated that at the stage of treaty negotiations, it may have been realised that many states

would nor be prepared to waive their immunity, which implied that state immunity has not been excluded under the Torture Convention. He added that the non-exclusion of state immunity must have
been a relatively small price to pay to achieve consensus on the treaty" This argument is not based on
the ircaxcpreparatoiresof the Torture Convention but on the subjective intentions of the state parties
and is therefore entirely speculative. Such reasoning can also be used to arrive at the opposite conclusion that states should be presumed to have waived their immunity on the basis that the conflict between immunity and universal lurisdietion under the Torture Convention is obvious.
Another argument in favour of the existence of immunity under the Torture Convention is based on
the fact that extradition can be sought in some parts of the world on the basis of a simpic allegation unsupported bypnafadeevidencci Therefore, without state immunity, former Heads of State would be

OmprsNurrm's IrranaEtsaL LA,, arm

note 8,, at 115.

OppErais's INTrNATIxrNA. LAw, spm note 8, at 179.
Pinachd,

orpna

note 1, at 127.

United Nations Working Group on the Convention on Torture, HANoBoK ON rt- CONVENTION AG\[NST TORTURP .ND
OTHLR Csui, INNiUMAN oR DERAnDINc. Tr-rair-,- m PUNEsHAIrNT 131 (1988), cf .Pmt, sir note 1, at 109
'

Pndae. arm note

SPihodg,

1, at

129.

pApwnote 1. at 127.
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apprehensive about travelling abroad for fear of being subjected to legal processes and unfounded allegations emanating from states of different political persuasions."' Further, a Head of State or a state of-.
ficial may, for compelling political reasons, be the subject of an amnesty or some other form of settlement in the state where he has committed the crimes.'
These arguments, though persuasive, are not entirely convincing. In the absence of state immunity, the
possibility of initiation of prosecution or other legal proceedings against foreign Reads of States based
on political or other reasons cannot be denied. It is however submitted that the apprehensions of state
officials are, in themselves, insufficient to justify the preservation of state immunity in respect of
crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity constitute offences not only against the states where
the crimes are committed, but against the international community as a whole*' The failure to
investigate and prosecute perpetrators of international crimes amounts to a breach of the international
obligation to implement human rights treaties.' States cannot evade this duty by granting amnesty and
even the ratification of an amnesty law through some form of democratic procedure, would not alter
this conclusion. International obligations cannot be avoided by enacting inconsistent domestic law.
This is particularly so in the case of the Torture Convention, which confers universal jurisdiction on
national courts to prosecute torturers for crimes committed elsewhere. 7 Fear of political unrest in
another stte cannot be a justification for non-compliance with international law. International law
"
"

Phiochet,. ra

note 1 at 128,

Pinoche, supra note 1, at 127-128.

for the Former Yugoslavia, crimes
against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture and rape, committed as part of
widespread and systematic attacks on any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. Vt,
(1991) 30 LLM, 1584. The notion that the crime shocked the conscience of humanity is generally believed to have arisen
from the tenets of natural [w.

M.N. SFUMw,
INTIt.NATIi)now1 LAw 472 (1998). According to the International Tribunal

As per the General Assembly Resolution on "Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection. Arrest, Etradition,
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity", states have a duty to co-operate on questions of extraditing persons against who there is evidence of commission of crimes against humanity, (1974) 13 .LM 130 at
130-131- A state violates customary law "if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones inter alia, torture,
murder, or disappearances. A government may be presumed to have encouraged or condoned [these] acts
if such acts, especially hy its officials, have been repeated and no steps have been taken to prevent them or to punish the perpetrators." SV,
Rit-S-rxrr.NrNT (Tlitlt) oF THErFori<cN RELATIONs Law or THe UamD STATrs § 702 (Proposed Official Draft, 1987). The
duty to prosecute grave violations Of human rights has been made explicit in the Inter-Anerican Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture (See, (1986) 25 I.L.M. 5191 adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in 1985.
It sets forth measure' that scates parties must adopt to eradicate torture which is prohibited by the American Convention on
Human Rights. As per Article 13 of the Deaft Declaration on the Protecon of All Persons From Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, "whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that an enftirced or involuntary disappearance has been
committed, the State shall promptly refer the matter [for an impartial] investigation, even if there has been no formal complaint." Article 13 of the Draft further provides that states shall ensure that a person alleged to have committed a disappearance is brought to justice either through prosecution or extradition, "regardless of the individual's nationality or the place
where the offence was committed", U.N. Doc, E/CN.4/1991/49. Principles designed to implement the Declaration of Basic
Principles of justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, 40 UN. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 53) at 213,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985), calls upon states to investigare deaths and serious injuries apparently caused by law enforcement
or other professional personnel and to prosecute or extradite those who are responsible. The Declaration also prohibits immunity from prosecution for public officials and agents.
More than three centuries before the Nuremberg trials, the eminent Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, framed a natural law gusrification for universal jisdiction to the effect that legal status and consequences of some crimes transcended the province of
municipal law A person who committed crimes against humanity was, like a pirate, hosds havanigenews, "an enemy of al mankind", over whom any state could assert criminal jurisdiction.
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along with the support of the international community is itself a strong defence for the forum state to
justify its action against fear of political unrest in another state.
Only in very rare instances have national courts been confronted with international law issues of the
magnitude and complexity and with consequences as those involved in the Pinochet case. Never before
has any national court been subject to such intense media scrutiny and international public opinion
over issues of international law. The House of Lords in this case was confronted with two choices- it
could have either upheld a traditional doctrine of international law, rooted in antiquated notions of
state sovereignty or adopred a progressive interpretation of the evolution of customary international
law to punish a powerful perpetrator of international crimes. The decision of majority of the House
of Lords to opt for the latter earned it accolades from a large body of international opinion. The persuasive value of this decision and the strong wave of international opinion in its favour have dealt an
immense blow to the credibility of the doctrine of state immunity as a defence against prosecution
for an international crime, The Pinorhet decision inspired tbe initiation of prosecution in national
courts for international crimes against many dictators or former Heads of States.' The impact of this
decision underlines the potential of national courts to contribute to the progressive development of
international law.

Congo v. Belgium
Congo v. Belgium forms, as it were, the counterpoint to the Pinochet case. In this case, the 1CJ addressed
several issues pertaining to state immunity and international criminal law for the first time. Whereas
the inochet case revolved around immunity razionae materiae, this case pertained to immunity raionnae
personae. The ICJ was called upon to decide the legality of a caim for immunity ratwnae-personae against
the initiation of criminal proceedings in a national court exercising universal jurisdiction.
Background
On April 11, 2000, a Belgian judge issued an international arrest warrant against Mr. Abdulaye
Yerodia Ndombasi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office of the Congo. The crimes with which
Mr. Yerodia was charged were punishable under the Belgian Law of June 16, 1993 "concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 ,h August 1949 and
of Protocols I and II of 8th June 1977 Additional Thereto", as amended by the Law of February 19,
1999 "concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law"." Article 7 of the Belgian Law provides that "[t]he Belgian courts shall have jurisdiction in respect of the
offences provided for in the present Law, wheresoever they may have been committed." Further, Article 5(3) of the Belgian Law provides that "[ijmmunity attaching to the official capacity of a person
shall not prevent the application of the present law" As Mr. Yerodia was present in Congo, the arrest
warrant was transmitted there.
Congo approached the ICJ seeking annulment of the arrest warrant. It contended that by issuing the
warrant, Belgium had violated the "principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory
of another State", the "principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations, as

See, Sheetal B.Asrani and MP Ajith Sunghay, Iinga Dupots to jestice: Theguestfor a Effeine Lal Regime, 40(2) 1.J.
L. 178 (2000).
*

Hereinafter thc "Belgian Law'

69

INT

Vol. 15

Student Bar Reie

2003

laid down in Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations", as well as the diplomatic immunity
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State, as recognised by the jurisprudence of the Iq
and following from Article 41(2) of the Vienna Convention. Congo claimed that "[tlbe non-recognition, on the basis of Article 5 . . of the Belgian Law, of the immunity of a Minister for Foreign A&fairs in office" constituted a "[v]iolation of the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign AFfairs of a sovereign State, as recognized by the urisprudence of the Court and following from Article
41, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of April 18, 1961 on Diplomatic Relations." "
The JCJ declared that the arrest warrant by Belgium was illegal as it violated state immunity exercisable by Congo over its incumbent Minister.
An Analysis of the Decision
The ICJ observed that it is firmly established in international law that diplomatic and consular agents
and holders of high-ranking offices in a state, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and
Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunity from the exercise of jurisdiction by other states. It
agreed with Congo's contention that no distinction could be drawn between a Minister of Foreign Affairs' "official" or "private" capacities and that such an individual would be entitled to immunity in respect of all acts done while in office, whether civil or criminal.5' It stated that such protection was
needed to enable the efficient discharge of functions by state functionaries. Belgium argued that such
immunities could not offer protection against war crimes or crimes against humanity. Belgium cited
the Pinorbet case in support of its contention." The ICJ rejected this submission and held that no
norm of international law, depriving state immunity to an incumbent foreign minister accused of
committing international crimes, could be discerned from state practice, international conventions or
decisions of national courts. It stated that the imposition of obligations on states by various international conventions to prosecute or extradite offenders of international criminal law did not affect immunities under customary international law. The ICJ agreed with Congo's contention that the denial
of state immuruity to persons accused of international crimes before international courts or tribnals
had no bearing on state immunity before national courts. The ICJ therefore disagreed with the House
of Lords' judgment in the Pinodet case which based its decision on the exclusion of state immunity in
respect of international crimes, partially on the basis of reliance on international conventions which
expressly provided such a stipulation:"Thus, the IC) has clearly rejected all arguments about the evo-

Se gpnemlC,
Congo v. 13qin, supra note 3.
Congo quoted a statement from Lord Browne-Wilkinson's judgment in the Pinoetcase that "....immunity enoyed by a
Head of State in power and an ambassador in post is a complete immunity attached to the person of the Head of Statu or
amhassador and rendering him immune from all actions or prosecutions.. ." Congo also cited a decision of the French
Court of Cassation holding that "international custom bars the prosecution of incumbent Heads of Sure, in the absence
of ay Contrary internarional provision btnding on the parties concerned, before the criminal courts of a foreign State "
.

Belgium sought support from the statements of Lord Millett that "[ilnternational law cannot be supposed to have established a rnme having rhe character of aus cens and at the same Time to have provided an immunity which is co-extenasive
with the obligation it seeks to impose", and Lord Phillips that "no established rule of international law requires state immuniiy ratioawe matene to be accorded in respect of prosecution for an international crome."

"

Lord Goff strongly dissented from this view. He stated that as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters and Statutes fat the Internationial Tribunlb m Yugoslavia and Rwanda pertained to individual criminal responsibility before international taibunals, they do not throw any light on whether commission of an international crime can be construed to be an officiil act
of a Head of Sure for purposes of state immunity Pinene upra note 1, at 120-121.
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lution of a customary norm to the effect that immunity raionaepersonae would be overridden in respect of international crimes.
To understand the legal rationale of the IQCdecision, the crucial factual distinction between this case
and the Pinohret case has to be reiterated. While the Pinochet case dealt with immunity radonae materia,
the IJ, in this case, dealt with immunity ratonnepensone. The latter immunity is much wider in scope
than the former. Immunity ramionaeperronaeis personal in nature and by its very nature attaches to the
person of the state official. Therefore, as the ICJ pointed but, all acts of an incumbent state official
are immune from civil or criminal proceedings in a foreign state irrespective of their nexus with his
official functions. Unlike in the case of immunity rationaemateriae, proof of the official nature of the
impugned Acts is not necessary to claim immunity rationae peonae. Belgium did ask that a distinction
be drawn between the official and personal acts of an incumbent state official and that immunity be
granted only for the former. The rejection of this contention is consistent with the personal nature of
the immunity available to an incumbent state officiaL
The ICJ oudined four circumstances in which immunities would not pose a bar against prosecution
for international crimes:
*

*
*

*

Persons pleading immunity would enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their
own countries, and could thus be tried by those countries' courts in accordance with the relevant
rules of domestic law
Persons would be subject to foreign jurisdiction if their state waived immunity.
After a stare official ceases to hold office, he would no longer enjoy the immunities accorded to
him by international law in other states Provided that it had jurisdiction under international law,
courts of one state might try a former official of a foreign state for acts committed prior or subsequent to his period of office, as well as for acts committed during that period of office, in a
pnvate capacity
Fourthly, an incumbent or former state official might be subject to criminal proceedings before
certain international criminal courts, where such courts have urisdiction.

The third exception enunciated by the ICJ is most relevant for the purposes of this paper. The ICJ
stated that an incumbent state official loses some of his immunities when he ceases to hold office.
The ICJ added that a foreign court may try a former official of a foreign state for acts committed
prior to or subsequent to his period of office and for acts committed during the period of his office,
in a private capacity. This third exception, thus, essentially refers to those acts for which a former
state official would not enjoy immunity rationae materiae, i.e. personal acts or acts committed in a private capacity. Therefore, while a state official is totally immune from jurisdiction of foreign courts
when in office, he ceases to have immunity for his personal acts committed while holding office, once
he ceases to hold such office. Applying the Pinde't case, international crimes cannot constitute official
acts of a state and therefore, former state officials can be prosecuted in a foreign court exercising jurisdiction over international crimes for personal acts committed while in office.
This decision of the ICJ has been criticised for obstructing the evolution of international law towards
the removal of state immunity in respect of international crimes. This criticism seems to be unfair.
"

He& Altman, Te Fntr of Head of Stat Inmanit: The Cae again Ane/Sharon. hiteLbawindictabaron.netheidiahmun
a$di2,pd4 (visited on July 24, 2002).
71

1Student
Bar Retiew

Vol. 15

2003

The only method by which the ICJ could have denied immunity was by creating a distinction between
official and personal acts while applying immunity radonae personae. The ICJ could not have resorted to
such an interpretation as this would have conflicted with the well-established understanding of irnmunity raionae personae in customary international law according to which no such distinction exists. The
ICJ merely followed its mandate under its parent statute to adjudicate as per international law"
The ICJ did not comment upon the merits of the Pinochet decision. The third exception to the doc
trine of state immunity that it mentioned gives sufficient scope for national courts to deny immunity
raionae materiae for international crimes on the lines of the Pinochet decision as outlined above. Therefore the ICJ's decision does not fully arrest the precedent created by the Pinochet decision. The Pinoc/.t
decision continues to be a precedent for cases pertaining to immunity raionae materiae. But this precedent set by the ICJ would prevent extension of die progressive interpretation resorted to in the
Pinochet case to immunity rationaepersonae in the near future.

Conclusion
The Pinochet decision and the decision of the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium have raised troublesome questions
about the relevance and purpose of state immunity in the light of evolution of universal jurisdiction
in international criminal law The concept of state immunity is rooted in a positivistic paradigm of in-

ternational law where consent of the state is the only legitimate basis for the creation of international
law56 Though various reasons are cited for the growth of the concept of state immunity, its primary
legal basis lies in the voluntary waiver of jurisdiction amounting to an "implied licence" from the judi
cial, executive and enforcement jurisdiction of the receiving state. What was once an implied licence
has now evolved into a legal obligation.? However, since its inception, state immunity has evolved in
accordance with international realities. The absolute immunity of a state is excluded where the state
or its entities act as commercial enterprises. State immunity has not prevented successful suits against
perpetrators of international crimesS
International conventions have expressly outlawed the defence of state immunity and international
opinion too is increasingly in favour of such a position. However, despite the existence of strong international opinion favouring the removal of all immunities in respect of prosecution for international crimes, the ICJ has rightly pointed out there is insufficient state practice to convert such an
opinion into customary international law. At best such an opinion represents kxferenda, indicating

Under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of justice, the ICJ is bound to decide disputes that are submitted to it as per international law.
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This can be inferred from the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations submined in May 1993 regarding the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia which stated that virtually all the written comments received by the Secretary General suggested thst the Statute of the nternational Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia should contain provisions denying immunity to Heads of State, government officials and other persons acting in an official capacity-
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progressive development of international law."' Creative interpretations and the legal ingenuity which
overcame this handicap in the Pinochet decision, were incapable of replication in Congo v Belgium
Despite the recent establishment of the International Criminal Court, the role of national courts in
the enforcement of international criminal law will continue to remain significant. The concept of
state immunity will therefore continue to be an important battleground between traditional notions of
sovereignty and demands for accountability for the violation of human rights. The decision of the
ICJ in Cong v. Beigium proves that the latter has not yet won.

An American court in Tadhiona v Mgale, (2001 US Dist LEXIS 18712) remarked on a submission for denial of state immunisry "The progression of she lega precepts and theories plaintiffs here invoke, despite critical strides marked in recent
yeams, sllI traits behind Human aspirations and has some dme and way to go so close the gaps.
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